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Although Gilles Deleuze never explicitly develops what might be con-
sidered a philosophy of technology, this article nonetheless attempts to outline  
the rudiments of a Deleuzian approach to technology by proposing a series of  
interrelated concepts: (1) prosthesis (technological artifacts are externalized or-
gans); (2) proto-technicity, or originary technicity (but this technicity already  
exists in Nature, all the way down, and precedes any theory); (3) exodarwinism  
(the fact that evolutionary time has bifurcated, and technology evolves in a faster  
and accelerating time scale); (4) de-specialization or de-differentiation (what 
conditions the externalization of organs is their deterritorialization); (5) 
motricity (the link between the brain and the hand/mouth is primarily one of  
movement); (6) inscription, or graphism (the link between mouth and hand takes  
place through phonetic writing, when the hand reproduces speech in graphic  
inscriptions); (7) maker’s knowledge (we know the organizations of matter found  
in nature through the organizations of matter that we ourselves have created);  
and finally, (8) totipotence (like a stem cell, the body is capable of being exter- 
nalized in an almost unlimited number of forms and functions; it is itself an 
abstraction and the source of abstractions).
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Although Gilles Deleuze never explicitly develops what might be considered 
a philosophy of technology, he is strongly influenced by thinkers such as André 
Leroi-Gourhan, Raymond Ruyer, and Gilbert Simondon, all of whom provide 
profound analyses of the nature of technicity.  Moreover, works such as Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia are grounded in a profound concept of machinism.1  In what 
follows, I would like to offer some Deleuzian reflections on the nature of technol-
ogy, and more specifically on the nature of the relationship between technology 
and thought.  Deleuze famously defines philosophy as the creation of concepts, 
and I would propose, in a tentative manner, several concepts that, taken together, 
may help lay out the rudiments of a Deleuzian philosophy of technology: prosthesis, 
proto-technicity, exodarwinism, de-specialization, motricity, inscription, maker’s 
knowledge, and totipotence.
I. Prosthesis
Speaking in general terms, technologies are “prosthetic,” so to speak—that 
is, they are extensions of the body.  The German thinker Ernst Kapp, in his 1877 
book Elements of a Philosophy of Technology, seems to have been the first to pro-
pound this idea of technical objects as organ projections.2  I can pound a stake 
into the ground with my fist, but I do a much better job if I use a hammer, which 
mimics my forearm and fist.  In place of the arm, technology substitutes an ex-
ternal artifact that resembles the arm: with a hammer in our hands, my flesh and 
bones become wood and iron, like an exoskeleton.  Similarly, the wheel externalizes 
the quasi-spherical articulations of our hips, knees, and ankles; clothing externalizes 
the skin; a baby’s bottle externalizes its mother’s breast; a kitchen stove is an exten- 
sion of the stomach; and so on.  We have even managed to mimic the organs of other 
species: airplanes mimic the wings of birds; scuba equipment mimics the gills of 
fish, albeit with different means.  Technology is an apparatus that has been extracted 
from the body, like a ship leaving port.  This, it seems to me, is the basic point from 
which one has to start: technology is primarily corporeal, it is derived from the body. 
As such, technology marks a first threshold of life.  As Marshall McLuhan puts it 
in the subtitle of Understanding Media, technologies are “the extensions of man.” 
Or, in Bernard Stiegler’s words, “as a ‘process of externalization,’ technics is the pur- 
suit of life by means other than life” (17).
1 For an analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of machinism, see Sauvagnarges 185-94.
2 For Kapp, the necessity for technics derives from man’s organ deficiencies, and he distinguishes be- 
tween the principles of organic relief (Organentlastung), organic substitution or replacement (Organersatzes), 
and organic strengthening or improvement (Organüberbeitung).  In France, Kapp’s work in turn influenced 
the work of Alfred Espinas, notably his Les origines de la technologie.
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Scientific instruments, for instance, constitute a vast sensorium spread out in 
a space that constitutes an externalized prosthetic body: telescopic eyes (like the 
Hubble telescope, or its successor, the Webb telescope) that magnify and record 
light on film; radio dishes as vast ears that listen to the heavenly noise; seismo-
graphs like vast fingers and nerve endings that sense the slightest tremor in the 
ground; or colliders that allow us to register the effects of particle collisions, as in 
the recent discovery of the Higgs boson.  What is sometimes called the scientific 
revolution took place in part because of our ability to extend our senses in such 
technical artifacts.3
II. Proto-Technicity
But one must immediately modify this concept of prosthetics in two directions. 
On the one hand, the concept of prosthetics tends to presume the initial integrity 
of the body, which secondarily extends itself spatially.  But in fact, the body itself 
must be comprehended in terms of its natural technicity.  As Marx puts it, in a 
famous text, the greatness of Darwin was that he “directed attention to the history 
of natural technology, that is, the formation of the organs and plants of animals” 
(cited in Stiegler 26).  In his book Climbing Mount Improbable, Richard Dawkins 
has an intriguing chapter, aptly titled “The Forty-Fold Path to Enlightenment,” 
that analyses the fact that eyes—which Dawkins calls “a remote sensing technol-
ogy”—have evolved no fewer than forty times in the animal kingdom in accord- 
ance with nine distinct principles (138-39).  From this viewpoint, not only eyes, 
but eggs, exoskeletons, feathers, hair, hooves, nails, teeth, the shells of turtles, and the 
scales of anteaters are all forms of what we might call proto-technicity, or “originary 
technicity.”4  This is what Deleuze and Guattari term “machinism.”
The idea of proto-technicity was perhaps developed most convincingly by 
the French philosopher Raymond Ruyer.5  Consider a unicellular animal such as 
an amoeba: it can digest food, even though it does not have digestive organs such 
as a stomach or intestines; it is able to react in intelligible ways to its environment, 
even though it has neither a nervous system nor any sensory organs; we could thus 
say that it thinks, even though it lacks a brain.  In other words, though it has neither 
a brain, nor a nervous system, nor a stomach, an amoeba can think, can digest food, 
and can move about intelligibly in its environment.  Ruyer’s conclusion is that bodily 
3 On the role of instruments in science, see Galison.
4 The term “originary technicity” was initially coined by Jacques Derrida and developed by Bernard 
Stiegler.  See Bradley.
5 See Ruyer, Éléments 42-51, and Neofinalism 17-22.
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organs are themselves technical artifacts.  I do not necessarily need a hammer to pound 
a stake into the ground, but I can do a better job if I have one.  Similarly, organisms 
do not need a stomach to digest, or a brain to think, or a nervous system to inter- 
act with the environment, but they digest and interact better if they have specialized 
organs fulfilling these functions.6  In short, if tools are externalized projections 
of our organs, we would equally have to say that our bodily organs—stomachs, 
lungs, kidneys, brains—are themselves technologies that have been created by 
the organism itself in the course of evolution.  In Deleuze’s terminology, the egg 
is a body without organs, and organs are artifacts that are created by the egg in 
the course of embryogenesis.  This is why, in a provocative turn of phrase, Ruyer 
sometimes calls the embryo our “primary consciousness,” since an embryo has a 
knowledge that is far vaster than the knowledge our brains have.  An embryo easily 
and routinely creates numerous organs (brain, heart, stomach, lungs, kidneys) that 
the human brain is now trying to re-create artificially (artificial hearts, dialysis ma- 
chines that replace the functioning of kidneys, artificial intelligence).  But the embryo, 
our primary consciousness, creates these organs with a perfection that the brain, 
our secondary consciousness, can scarcely replicate.7
Nietzsche had already suggested that the most perfected form of knowledge 
we possess is knowledge that has been literally “incorporated”—it has been 
corporealized, it has become part of the body.8  This is the kind of knowledge a 
pianist has of a piece of music, or a basketball player has of his game: the knowl-
edge is incorporated into their body as a motor habit (muscle memory).  Students 
today are generally proficient typists, and typing obviously requires a knowledge 
of the layout of the computer keyboard.  But if students are asked to identify the 
two letters to the left and right of the letter “c” on their keyboard, only a few are 
able to answer.  The knowledge has been incorporated into their body and has 
largely disappeared from consciousness.
This is the kind of perfected primary knowledge that an embryo possesses, 
as opposed to the more limited secondary knowledge possessed by consciousness. 
Indeed, consciousness most usually intervenes when we lack knowledge—when 
6 On the amoeba, see Ruyer, “Le paradoxe,” who in turn was drawing on Henri Bergson’s classic essay, 
“Life and Consciousness.”
7 “The embryo’s primary consciousness is no more vague than the [secondary] consciousness of the 
adult” (Ruyer, Neofinalism 71).
8 Nietzsche notes that the human species has hitherto survived by “incorporating” numerous erroneous 
presumptions (“that there are enduring things . . . that there are things, substances, and bodies . . . that our 
will is free”) and that it was only recently that these presumptions were denied and doubted in the name 
of truth—“the weakest form of knowledge.”  In the present, “the thinker is now that being in whom the 
impulse for truth and those life preserving errors clash for their first fight.”  The question for the future is 
“To what extent can truth endure incorporation?  That is the question; that is the experiment” (110, 169-71).
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we have to consciously look at the keyboard or double-check a musical score. 
The kind of incorporated knowledge we have when we play an instrument or 
play a sport is close to the kind of perfected corporeal knowledge of an embryo, 
in which the conscious self-awareness of the brain does not intervene at all.
Technicity and life interpenetrate each other.  If technology is an externaliza- 
tion of the body, we must also say that bodily organs are themselves technologies. 
There is a technicity that reaches all the way down to the reproductive capacities of 
the smallest bacteria, and it is conceptually misleading to separate the two.  Mutation 
and selection are two mechanisms of this natural technology.  Indeed, as Michel Serres 
has remarked (Rameaux 154), the ancient ruins of long-vanished civilizations or 
even modern junkyards filled with the carcasses of rusting automobiles are not 
that different from the fossilized remains of the Cambrian period that are found in 
the Burgess Shales in the Canadian Rockies, about which Stephen Jay Gould wrote 
his superb book called Wonderful Life.  They are all, Serres suggests, cemeteries of 
externalized techniques—fossil remains, ancient ruins, modern junkyards.
III. Exodarwinism
The concept of prosthetics must also be modified in a second direction.  A 
cigarette lighter, for instance, can hardly be seen as an organ projection.  Rather, 
what characterizes technical artifacts is that these externalized organs are detachable, 
removable; they become separated from the body, and as such, they have the ad- 
vantage of mobility.  A lion’s fur, for instance, forces it to rather quickly halt a 
chase when it becomes overheated; but when fur is externalized in a coat, it can 
be put on and off at will, according to quickly changing conditions of hot and 
cold.  An important consequence follows from this detachability.  Having been de- 
tached from the body, technical objects enter into their own evolutionary history— 
a trajectory that Serres has called an “exodarwinism” (Rameaux 150).  Evolution 
bifurcates: biological evolution produces organisms, with their own proto-tech-
nicity; but these organisms then produce technical artifacts that interconnect with 
each other in complex networks to produce a new body with its own moving 
tissue—a body for which Kevin Kelly has aptly coined the term technium (11).
The evolution of this new externalized body not only moves at a faster pace 
than normal evolution, but it is moving at an increasingly accelerated pace.  In-
deed, it is this other evolutionary time people are referring to when they talk about 
the fast pace of modern life.9  One would be tempted to say that each of us now 
9 See Gleick.
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lives in two bodies and participates in two evolutionary temporalities: our organic 
body, which is sculpted by an extremely slow-moving evolutionary process; and 
the second technological body (the technium) that we have created around ourselves, 
which is formed, more rapidly, by exodarwinism.  And of course, this second body 
begins to react back upon the first, producing all the complexities of what we call 
the new bio-technologies, and the theme of the cyborg.10
IV. De-specialization
But this raises a delicate question: other species create and use technology— 
spiders weave webs, beavers build dams, birds make nests—but without entering 
into this “exodarwinian” time.  Their techniques seem largely tied to their genetic 
makeup.  What is it that has allowed the artifacts produced by the human species 
to become detached from its organic body, such that its extended body is now 
spread over the entire planet?  Deleuze’s answer: deterritorialization.  In evolu-
tionary theory, the bodies of living beings are transformed through two processes, 
mutation and selection, which allow an organism to specialize in such a way that 
it can better exploit the resources of its particular ecological niche.  But the human 
species, somewhat paradoxically, has been partly disengaged from this schema: 
whereas other species tend to be genetic automatons, largely following their ge- 
netic programming, humans have been, as it were, de-programmed or de-specialized, 
de-speciated.  How did this happen?
If we follow the theses of André Leroi-Gourhan in Gesture and Speech, the 
answer to this question must be found in the body, and in the upright position 
that the body assumed in the (first) evolutionary process.  As humans assumed 
the upright position, their front paws gradually lost their faculty of locomotion, 
but in the process evolution invented the hand, which became what Aristotle calls 
“a tool of tools,” a kind of generalized tool.11  At the same time, the mouth largely 
lost its capacity for prehension, which was taken over by the hand, but in the pro- 
cess it gained the capacity for speech.  In other words, the hand and the mouth went 
through a process of “de-territorialization”: in the upright position, they are literally 
removed from the earth or the ground (the terre, in French).12  Put differently, far 
10 Serres’s L’Hominescence is a profound analysis of the technium and the process of exodarwinism.
11 “The soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms 
and sense the form of sensible things” (Aristotle 432a).
12 One might note that Deleuze and Guattari adapt Leroi-Gourhan’s hand-mouth distinction in various 
manners throughout their works: form of expression (the mouth, or speech) and form of content (the hand, 
or technology); collective assemblages of enunciation and machinic assemblages of desire; code and terri- 
tory; discursive knowledge and non-discursive knowledge.
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from being animals that are well adapted to their environment, humans are “cham- 
pions of inadaptation” (Serres, Incandescent 41).  Because we are not adapted to 
any particular environment, we can adapt to almost any environment.  And the fact 
is that evolution takes place only through inadaptation, since species that are al- 
ready perfectly adapted to their environment, such as jellyfish, have hardly changed 
since the Cambrian period, and have no reason to change (Serres, Hominescence 43).
Put differently, we might say that, through deterritorialization, the human 
body has become a generality, not unlike the algebraic variable x, which can take 
on any and all values because it has no value in itself.  Or, to use an image sug-
gested by Michel Serres: it is like a stem cell, capable of giving rise to any cell type 
or a complete embryo (Incandescent 41-8).  Embryologists have coined a term to de- 
scribe this state of a stem cell: “totipotence” [toe-‘ti-po-tence], which can be con- 
trasted with the term “omnipotence” often used to describe God.  Stem cells are not 
omnipotent, they are not all-powerful; but they are totipotent, they have the power 
of taking on an almost indefinite number of forms and functions.  Thus, whereas 
other species fill their niche to perfection, humans have been able to leave their local 
niche and to open themselves onto a global space.  We have been able to do this be- 
cause of the de-specialization or de-differentiation of our own organs, which has 
allowed us to create extended organs in the externalized body of the technium.
V. Motricity
This brings us to a fifth concept: motricity.  It is one thing to say the human 
body has been deterritorialized and despecialized, and that this is a condition of 
our technicity.  But what about the brain?  Do we also not have to say that the 
fabrication of technical artifacts is a sign of superior human intelligence?  At bot- 
tom, is it not true that we humans are able to build airplanes and computers be-
cause, to put it bluntly, we are the smartest creatures on the planet?  Whatever the 
deterritorialized status of our bodies, is it not the brain that really counts?  The answer 
to all these questions is: no. Leroi-Gourhan, for instance, strongly critiques brain- 
centered versions of evolution, like that of Teilhard de Chardin, who interpreted 
evolution as a movement toward an expanded consciousness.  The determining 
factor of human evolution, he argues, was not intelligence, but locomotion (Gesture 
and Speech 26).  In other words, what has driven human evolution was not the brain, 
but a more modest body part, the foot, since it was modifications in the foot that 
allowed humans to assume the upright position.  It is true that the upright position 
also allowed for the expansion of the skull, which gave humans bigger brains, since 
a vertical spine can support a heavier cranium than a horizontal spine.  But this was 
an effect of the evolutionary process and not its cause.
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But why then would a bigger brain matter?  If animals, compared to plants, 
have more developed nervous systems, it is because animals have to move about in 
their environment in order to feed and survive, whereas plants can remain largely 
immobile, since chlorophyll allows them to “feed” directly from the sun.  In animals, 
the nervous system is thus the interface between the organism and its environment, 
or more exactly, between the organism’s sensory organs (which provide input from 
the environment) and its locomotor apparatuses (which allow it to act).13  A larger 
brain thus allows for a greater and more accurate motricity.14
Motricity is important for thinking about technicity, in turn, for several 
reasons.  First, in the movement toward the upright position, the brain became 
bigger at exactly the same time that the hand and face became deterritorialized. 
As Leroi-Gourhan insists, the triple “liberation” of the brain, the hand, and the 
mouth was one and the same phenomenon.  A considerable amount of brain activity 
is oriented toward coordinating the muscles in the hand and the face, which lie at 
the origin of both technicity (produced by the movement of the hand) and speech 
(produced by the movement of the mouth).  This is why Leroi-Gourhan himself, 
in his early two-volume masterpiece Evolution and Techniques, analyzes technical 
artifacts, not as externalized organs (as Ernst Kapp does), but rather as an exter- 
nalization of our sensory-motor movements, such as prehension (grasping, turning, 
sawing) and percussion (striking, pounding).15  This is also why Deleuze (and others) 
can speak about a movement that is proper to thought, since thinking takes place 
through both language and technicity, as we shall see.16
Second, if tools are externalized organs, it follows that our brains have also 
been externalized and become part of the technium.  The great anthropologist Jack 
Goody writes extensively about what he calls the “technologies of the intellect,” 
that is, technologies that have externalized our intellects.17  The most important 
example of a technology of the intellect is writing, which is a highly complex 
technology that requires a surface to write on (stone, vellum, parchment, paper) 
and an instrument to do the writing (chisel, pen, pencil).  In other words, writing, 
like speech, is a complicated motor skill, though speech and writing are very dif- 
ferent from each other.  Speech is a motor technique of the mouth, which children 
13 On these points, see Bergson 133-39.
14 Oliver Sacks notes that anatomists can tell that a person is a pianist by examining their MRI brain 
scans, because the motor sequences required to play the piano are complex, and the pathways can be seen 
in their brain imaging (94).
15 SeeVol. 1: L’Homme et la matière and Vol. 2: Milieu et technique.
16 In the lecture “Movement-Image,” Deleuze remarks: “There is a speed proper to thought, there is a 
movement proper to thought, there is a duration proper to thought” (my translation).
17 See, among others, Goody, Domestication; Interface; Logic; and Power.
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learn fairly quickly; phonetic writing is a technique for transferring speech into spa- 
tialized drawings using the hand and requires years of training.18  Writing brought 
about a profound transformation in the hand-mouth relation, which would be 
modified again with the advent of computers.
Indeed, as a technology of the intellect, one might consider the computer 
from the viewpoint of three faculties of the mind that classical philosophers often 
identified: memory, imagination, and reason.  The memory in a computer is a 
million times more powerful than one’s own memory and can be accessed anytime 
(“Let’s google it”).  Its imagination is equally enormous, nourished by millions of 
icons and images.  (Compare this to the fact that the only images a typical medi-
eval peasant in Europe might have seen during their life were probably the stained 
glass windows and paintings at their local parish church or cathedral.)  Computers 
even have a faculty of reason, since their programs can solve numerous problems 
that we could never have solved on our own.  (For many mathematicians, having 
a computer is much more important than having a formal axiomatic).  It is as if 
our heads—our brains and our minds—have been externalized in front of us in 
an objectified cognitive box, which we can now tuck away and carry around with 
us in our backpacks, just as our forearm and fist are objectified in a hammer.
VI. Inscription
The idea that writing constitutes a technology of the intellect implies a sixth 
concept, graphism, or what amounts to the same thing, inscription, to use Deleuze 
and Guattari’s vocabulary in Anti-Oedipus.19  Inscription is a broad category that 
includes not only writing and symbolization, but also drawing and art, as well as 
markings inscribed on the body (tattoos, piercings, circumcisions).  We often forget 
that learning how to write is learning how to draw, albeit in a particular manner. 
We also forget that writing is itself a technology whose effects have arguably been 
more far-reaching than almost any other technology.  Bergson notes that the im- 
mediate advantages humans may derive from a new technical artifact “is a slight 
matter compared with the new ideas and new feelings that the invention may give 
rise to in every direction,” and this is certainly true of writing (Bergson 201). 
Above all, writing is an externalization of memory.  In so-called oral cultures, 
18 The classic analysis of the shift from oral to literate traditions is Walter Ong’s Orality and Literacy. 
Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato assesses the impact phonetic writing had on Greek philosophy, and notably 
Plato’s work.
19 “Society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be to circulate or to cause 
to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to mark and to be marked” (142).
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poems like the Iliad and the Odyssey had to be formulaically memorized, and any 
knowledge that existed had to be retained in the mind.  Hence the respect shown 
to elders, who were literally living libraries, living repositories of knowledge, 
knowledge that could simply disappear when the person died.20  But once 
knowledge was written down and externalized, it could be stored in books and 
libraries, or even in computer chips, and was available for consultation anytime. 
The move from “pre-history” to “history” is marked by the advent of writing. 
(This is why the burning of the library in Alexandria was one of the great catas-
trophes of the ancient world—it destroyed a considerable portion of the collec- 
tive memory of the human species.)  Philosophy itself was made possible by writing, 
as evidenced by the confrontation between Plato, who championed writing, and 
Socrates, who refused writing and praised living speech, and in this sense still be- 
longed to the old Homeric culture.  Writing also produced entirely new forms of 
religion—what we call “religions of the Book” (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), oriented 
around the interpretation of texts, and thus utterly focused on the technology of 
writing.  They are technological religions.  (Oral religions, by contrast, tended to be 
oriented around the voice.)21
VII. Maker’s Knowledge
The idea that our intellects have been externalized as much as our bodies takes 
us to a seventh concept, maker’s knowledge, which deals with the nature of the re- 
lationship between technology and thought.  Maker’s knowledge is a somewhat 
minor and subterranean tradition, and a short detour through the history of phi- 
losophy will help clarify its importance in thinking about technicity.
The Greeks famously distinguished between epistêmê (knowledge) and technê 
(know-how or craftsmanship), and it is well known that Plato elevates epistêmê over 
technê.  In some famous passages in the Republic and elsewhere, Plato claims that 
the user of a flute, for instance, knows the flute better than the maker of the flute, 
and the person who knows the Idea of the flute has a better knowledge than either 
the user or the maker.22  Some see in Plato’s texts a kind of elitism: a slave who fab- 
ricated things could not be allowed to be the possessor of a science superior to 
20 On the techniques of orality in Homeric verse, see Lord, and Parry.  On techniques of memorization, 
see Yates.
21 On the primacy of the voice in oral traditions—and particularly the relation between the human voice 
and animal voices—see Abram 137-53.
22 See Plato, Republic 597b, 601c; Cratylus 601c-d.
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that of the master who used them.23  For Plato, the highest knowledge is given to 
those who contemplate the intelligible form of Ideas, and not those who actively 
fabricate things.  Epistemology (the contemplative knowledge of the user or the 
beholder) wins out over technology (the active knowledge of the maker).
In emphasizing language over technicity, Plato sets the tone for much sub- 
sequent philosophy.  In contemporary analytic philosophy, there is a similar appeal 
to what is called “propositional knowledge,” the presupposition that knowledge is 
primarily expressed in propositions.24  In the continental tradition, Foucault em- 
phasizes what he calls “discursive formations,” as if thought was shaped primarily 
by discourse; Lacan similarly stresses the role of what he calls the “symbolic.”  In all 
these cases, in differing ways, there remains an implicit deprecation of knowledge 
that comes through making—in other words, technology—a denigration of 
knowing-how in favor of knowing-that, to use a terminology formulated by Gilbert 
Ryle (25-61).
It is not until the sixteenth century that the status of “maker’s knowledge” 
starts to be reconsidered and rejuvenated within philosophical discourse, notably 
in works such as Hobbes’s Leviathan and Vico’s The New Science.25  In the interven- 
ing period, to be sure, the knowledge of “makers”—metallurgists, brewers, sailors, 
potters, brewers, and so on—never disappeared and indeed proliferated.26  But 
the Renaissance engendered a philosophical restoration of the rights of maker’s 
knowledge, and it is Vico who provides the most succinct summary of the tradi-
tion in a famous phrase: “verum et factum convertuntur,” “the true and the made 
are interchangeable.”27  In other words, we truly understand only what we can make. 
Maker’s knowledge is a kind of knowledge per causas: makers have superior 
knowledge of the products of their creation because they cause them to come 
into being.  We can say we truly understand flight, for instance, because we have 
learned how to make planes.  Knowing is a kind of making, and there is a recip-
rocal relation between cognition and construction.
For both Hobbes and Vico, curiously, the two paradigms of maker’s knowledge 
are mathematics and the state, since both are made by humans and thus are de-
23 See, for instance, Farrington 106, 114.
24 An extreme version of such intellectualism is Stanley and Williamson’s “Knowing How,” which argues 
that all knowing-how is reducible to knowing-that.  For a rejoinder, see Noë, “Against Intellectualism,” 
which concludes that “neither linguistic analysis nor cultivated intuitions are the key to understanding the 
nature of mind” (290).
25 For overviews of the maker’s knowledge tradition, see Perez-Ramos, and Hintikka.
26 See Conner’s A People’s History of Science, which traces the history and role of maker’s knowledge in science.
27 “For the Latins, verum (the true) and factum (what is made) are interchangeable, or to use the cus- 
tomary language of the Schools, they are convertible” (Vico, On the Most Ancient Wisdom 45).  For analysis, 
see Berlin, especially 30-41.
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monstrable.28  Vico’s “new science” is the science of society and its history: we 
can understand society because we have made it ourselves, whereas we cannot 
truly understand Nature because it is made by God.29  Hobbes, in the opening of 
Leviathan, presents the state as “an artificial man,” a kind of “automata” fabricated 
by humans, and thus knowable by them (7).  We cannot have a maker’s knowledge 
of natural objects, since we do not make them; we find them ready-made, a brute 
fact that is simply given.  Though Kant never uses the term, his transcendental 
project can be seen as a continuation of the maker’s knowledge tradition.30
Maker’s knowledge has an obvious connection to what might be called actor’s 
knowledge, since making is an action.  In Critique of Judgment, Kant has already 
defined desire as “a faculty which by means of its representations is the cause of 
the actuality of the objects of those representations”(qtd. in Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus 25).  More generally, this is the basis of Kant’s distinction between 
theoretical reason and practical reason: “Practical reason is concerned not with 
objects in order to know them, but with its own capacity to make them real—which 
does require knowledge of them,” but a particular kind of knowledge that is neither 
theoretical nor conceptual but causal (Practical Reason 93; emphasis added).  For 
Aquinas, similarly, practical knowledge is “the cause of what it understands,” whereas 
“speculative” knowledge “is derived from the objects known.”31  Elizabeth 
Anscombe’s Intention is the locus classicus in considering intentional action as a 
form of maker’s knowledge (87).  Though they too never use the phrase, to my 
knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari’s work can be similarly placed in the maker’s 
knowledge tradition—a tradition that, in Deleuze’s language, poses the question 
of genesis.  Anti-Oedipus, in a Vico-esque manner, is an attempt to rewrite Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason (desire is productive) by replacing the transcendent 
Ideas that constitutes Kant’s postulates (World, God, Self ) with purely immanent 
syntheses (connection, dis junction, and conjunction) that serve as principles for 
28 Thomas Hobbes writes in Epistle Dedicatory to Lord Pierrepont: “The science of every subject is de- 
rived from a precognition of the causes, generation, and construction of the same; and consequently, where 
the causes are known, there is place for demonstration, but not where the causes are to seek for.  Geometry 
therefore is demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and described by our- 
selves; and civil philosophy is demonstrable, because we make the commonwealth ourselves.  But because 
of natural bodies we know not the construction, but seek it from the effects, there lies no demonstration 
of what the causes be we seek for, but only of what they may be” (cited in Hintikka 82).
29 Berlin notes that Vico’s distinction would reappear in nineteenth-century Germany in the difference 
between the Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences) and the Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences), each 
with their characteristic way of knowing: Erklären (explanation) and Verstehen (interpretation) (31).
30 Kant observes that “we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them.”  Moreover, 
“reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own” (Pure Reason Bxviii, Bxiii).
31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. S, obj. 1.
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the production of social formations (75).32  Even in the theoretical domain, they 
define philosophy as the activity of fabricating concepts,33 and insist that the proper 
question to be posed about a concept is not “What does it mean?”  but rather “How 
does it work?”  (Anti-Oedipus 109).
This all-too-brief detour through the history of philosophy should nonetheless 
make clear the importance of the maker’s knowledge tradition in analyzing the nature 
of technology.  Vico’s claim—that we can have a maker’s knowledge of history and 
society but not nature—can sound strange to modern ears, since we now seem to 
have a better understanding of nature than society, given the advances in the natural 
sciences, and the workings of politics and the economy can still seem something 
of a mystery.  But this is the point at which technology intervenes.  As Barry Cooper 
has written in Action into Nature, “modern technology can do in the realm of nature 
what Vico thought could be done only in the realm of history”(cited in Mitcham 
245).  To be sure, Vico thinks nature is susceptible to a mathematical treatment 
because mathematics is constructed by us and thus demonstrable.  Similarly, an 
experiment, though not necessarily a creation, can provide us with knowledge be- 
cause it allows us to artificially reassemble, recreate, and record the processes of nature. 
In remaking nature, we come to know the workings of nature.  Nonetheless, despite 
the justified emphasis on mathematics and experimentation in characterizations of 
science, the role of what we might call “technical schemata” in our knowledge of 
nature is often overlooked.
The fact is that we tend to think nature, to know nature, through our tech-
nologies.  Consider the following.  It is often said that, in the modern world, there 
have been three ages of machines: mechanical machines, like levers, pulleys, 
watches, and automata; energetic or thermodynamic machines, like the steam 
engines and electrical motors that powered what Toynbee was the first to call 
“the industrial revolution”; and finally, informational machines like computers 
and smartphones, which define the information age we are in the midst of.  Each 
of these machines has been used as a model to interpret nature as a whole, or ob-
jects within nature.  In the seventeenth century, the idea of mechanism arose from 
an analogy with the watch: the world is like a watch, with internal mechanisms 
that explain its functioning; animals, according to Descartes and LeMettrie, are 
themselves nothing but pieces of machinery; and just as a watch needs a watchmaker, 
the deists argue, so the world needs a creator.  The same happened in the nineteenth 
32 Of course, whereas Anscombe focuses on conscious intention, Deleuze and Guattari insist that 
intentionality is grounded (or rather, ungrounded) in unconscious desire.
33 Deleuze and Guattari cite Nietzsche: Philosophers “must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely 
purify and polish them, but must first make and create them, present them and make them convincing” 
(What is Philosophy? 2).
46 Tamkang Review 49.1 (December 2018)
century, when the world was interpreted in energetic terms: because of entropy, the world 
was going to end “not with a bang but a whimper.”34  Today, many people ap-
peal to the computer as a model for the mind: the brain is the hardware, and the 
mind is the software, running different programs in different modules.
Even before the age of machines, in the Latin Middle Ages, it was not the com- 
puter or the watch, but rather the book that functioned as an analogy for Nature. 
Nature was a book in which one could read “the stenography of God’s omniscient 
hand,”35 and for Galileo, that language of Nature turned out to be mathematics. 
In antiquity, Heraclitus similarly appealed to the bow and the lyre as models of 
a universe that harnessed two forms of energy, potential and kinetic, tension and 
release (“we pull on the string, and either an arrow or a tone is released”) (Rothenberg 
3, 111).  Other ancient thinkers appealed to the potter’s wheel, the lathe, and the 
spindle to conjure the concept of a spinning, perfect, harmonious universe: an 
eternal circle (Rothenberg 112-14).
For a long time, these supposed analogies seemed to me to follow an impossibly 
inverted logic.  We invent a technology—books, watches, computers—and then 
we project it onto Nature and say, “Nature itself is like one of our machines!” 
Nature is like a book, the universe is like a watch, the mind is like a computer. 
But Nature is not a watch, any more than the mind is a computer.  The entire 
thought process seemed anthropomorphic, analogy run amok, not unlike theology: 
just as we create gods in the image of humans, so we create Nature in the image of 
our technologies.  One might even go a step further: just as the Enlightenment ex- 
posed the notion of God as a human product, modeled on human attributes, perhaps 
we need a second Enlightenment that would expose our notion of Nature (some- 
times at least) as an equally human product, modeled on human technologies.  Or 
so I thought, for a while, with a Richard Dawkins-like sense of righteousness.
But this initial response becomes less tenable when one considers two im-
pressive counter-examples, namely, Darwin and Einstein.  The first chapter of 
Darwin’s 1859 Origin of Species is entitled “Variation under Domestication,” and 
in it Darwin analyzes the ways in which agriculturalists and stockbreeders had 
long been breeding animals and grafting plants in order to select and encourage 
certain traits.  Darwin presents his own theory as a projection of this artificial 
selection of traits undertaken by breeders into nature itself: a natural selection.36 
34 “The Hollow Men” (Eliot 82).
35 This famous phrase is from Robert Boyle’s The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy, referring to the prac- 
tice of shorthand, then much in vogue.  For Boyle, “living things were ‘texts’ whose interpretation called for 
‘penetrating indagations’ directed toward the discovery of their ‘unobvious properties’” (Harrison 78).
36 In his Introduction, Charles Darwin writes: “It is of the highest importance to gain a clear insight 
into the means of modification and co-adaptation.  At the commencement of my observations, it seemed 
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Like many others, Darwin uses a human technology to interpret nature.  Similarly, 
Einstein’s 1905 paper on special relativity begins with a reflection on the relation 
between two pieces of technology, a moving train and a ticking clock: “If I say: 
‘That train arrives here at 7 o’clock,’ I mean something like this: ‘The pointing of 
the small hand of my watch to 7 and the arrival of the train are simultaneous events.’”37 
Although Einstein was not imposing a technical model on Nature, the theory of rel- 
ativity would have been impossible to even think in a world without clocks.38  Two 
of the most important developments in the sciences—evolution and relativity—
were dependent for their formulation on previously developed technologies.
How then are we to understand the maker’s knowledge that is contained in 
these technical artifacts?  We usually tend to think of a piece of technology as an 
application of a theory—as when an architect designs a house and the contractors 
build it—but in the broadest sense it is the reverse that is true: from an evolutionary 
viewpoint, as we have seen, it is technology that long precedes theory.  Moreover, 
we often presume that the creation of a technical artifact requires a mental image 
in the mind of its maker, a model or representation of the object to be produced, 
an Idea.  Such is the hylomorphic schema that Gilbert Simondon famously critiques 
(39-51).  Gary Tomlinson has recently shown, in analyzing the prehistoric tool known 
as the “biface,” that the tool itself was the means of transmitting the operational 
sequences of its own production, without a self-conscious intentionality behind it.39 
Bertrand Gille has proposed the term “technemes” to indicate the knowledge that 
is thereby transmitted from master to apprentice (1144).  But we can now see why 
we would comprehend nature through our technologies.  It is not that we com- 
prehend nature through an analogy between natural objects and technical artifacts, 
or even that technologies provide us with metaphors for understanding nature. 
Analogy and metaphor are still primarily linguistic operations.  Rather, natural 
objects are organizations of matter, and tools and machines are the ways in which 
we have learned to organize matter.  Since we have a maker’s knowledge of our own 
machines, we use that knowledge—what we might call the “technical schemata” 
of those machines—to comprehend the organizations of matter that we find in 
nature.  In other words, it is our maker’s knowledge of technical artifacts that gives 
us a knowledge of the artifacts of nature itself.  Put succinctly, technologies are 
to me probable that a careful study of domesticated animals and of cultivated plants would offer the best chance 
of making out this obscure problem” (13).
37 Einstein, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies.”  Originally published in 1905 in German as 
“Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper” in Annalen der Physik.
38 See Galison 221-93, and Canales.
39 See Tomlinson, particularly the remarkable third chapter, “1,000,000 Years Ago: Acheulean Perfor- 
mances” (51-88).
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forms of knowledge: we know not only through what we can say (propositional 
knowledge), but also through what we can make, what we can do.
VIII. Totipotence
I would like to conclude, very speculatively, by returning to a concept we have 
already mentioned, namely, totipotence.  Following Serres, we have used the term 
as a way of describing the de-specialization of human organs such as the hands, 
which, like stem cells, are capable of taking on an indefinite number of functions. 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze speaks of white light, which contains virtually 
all colors, or white noise, which contains virtually all sounds.  In a similar vein, one 
might speak of the body without organs (the egg) as a white stem cell that contains 
virtually in itself all the organs and functions it is capable of externalizing.  But 
this brings us to a final speculative question: if technologies are externalizations of 
the body, is the human body also capable of externalizing its totipotence?  In other 
words, is abstraction itself born from our own bodies?
The initial answer would seem to be: yes.  Why did we once put fences around 
pastures and meadows except to create artificial empty white spaces in which we 
could raise our domesticated animals and plants?  The diversity of cultures on the 
planet presupposes this very gesture (the term “culture” is derived from “cultivation”). 
The same is true in economics, for what is a coin, a piece of money, except a white 
promise: we can exchange it for a night on the town, a meal with friends, a book to 
curl up with.  If money is equivalent to everything, it is because, in and of itself, 
it is worth nothing; it is a pure abstraction.  Do there exist cognitive white objects? 
A famous fragment of Anaximander identified the origin of geometry as what he 
called apeiron, an indefinite with no limits, in other words, a purely formal and 
white space that rather quickly received the name of the Earth or Geo, which geo- 
metry measured and mastered.  In algebra, as we have already noted, the variable 
x can take on all values because it has none in and of itself.
Indeed, one could say that metaphysics is itself the domain of dedifferentiated 
concepts.  For instance, the concept of matter is a hyle without specification; but 
when we confront matter in the form of wood, stone or metal, crystal, molecule, 
atom, particle, or quark, then the generic concept of matter becomes useless.  The 
white concept of space has a translucid content, innocent of all the things of the 
world; but when it becomes Euclidean space, or projective space, or a topological 
space that multiplies its dimensions, then we no longer say anything about space 
in general and it disappears from our preoccupations.  Similarly, desire and love 
are white concepts, since we always desire a particular thing and fall in love with a 
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particular person.  This is how metaphysics used to work: it was dedifferentiated. 
It spoke of the individual before we had either Peter, Paul, or Mary; it spoke of con- 
sciousness before it became the “consciousness of something” (Serres, Incandescent 
64-71).
But if this class of white concepts is made possible by the totipotence of our 
own bodies, then we would have to take the further step and follow Deleuze in af- 
firming that “the abstract is lived experience.  I would almost say that once you have 
reached lived experience, you reach the most fully living core of the abstract. . . . 
You can live nothing but the abstract and nobody has lived anything else but the 
abstract.”40
We have presented eight concepts as a preliminary manner of approaching 
Deleuze’s philosophy of technology: (1) prosthesis (technological artifacts are exter- 
nalized organs); (2) proto-technicity, or originary technicity (but this technicity 
already exists in Nature, all the way down, and precedes any theory); (3) exodarwinism 
(the fact that evolutionary time has bifurcated, and technology evolves in a faster 
and accelerating time scale); (4) de-specialization or de-differentiation (what con-
ditions the externalization of organs is their deterritorialization); (5) motricity (the 
link between the brain and the hand/mouth is primarily one of movement); (6) 
inscription, or graphism (the link between mouth and hand takes place through 
phonetic writing, when the hand reproduces speech in graphic inscriptions); (7) 
maker’s knowledge (we know the organizations of matter found in nature through 
the organizations of matter that we ourselves have created); and, finally, (8) totipotence 
(like a stem cell, the body is capable of being externalized in an almost unlimited 
number of forms and functions; it is itself an abstraction and the source of abstrac- 
tions).  Far from being complete or systematic, these concepts are components of 
an assemblage that inevitably remains open and dynamic.
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